The Straightforward Solution to SVG’s National Security Issue

As we approach the end of the year, it’s natural to shift into a reflective state of mind. We are encouraged to be grateful for how blessed we are as a nation. Despite the odds, we have continued to prosper in many ways, a testament to the resilience and determination of our people.

However, alongside the progress, there remains a pressing issue that demands our collective attention—the persistent and untreated pandemic of violent crime and murder. For those of us familiar with the dynamics of illicit underworld operations, it is clear that Saint Vincent does not have a stand alone “murder problem.” Instead, what we face is a broader crime problem—one that drives and perpetuates acts of violence. As Assistant Commissioner of Police in Charge of Crime Trevor Bailey recently highlighted, approximately 95% of recent murder victims were known to law enforcement for their involvement in criminal activities. This is in no way condoning, excusing, or diminishing the very criminal and immoral acts committed, but rather challenging the narrative that the average, law-abiding Vincentian is disproportionately at risk.

This statistic further shows the reality that law enforcement is aware of the bad actors in our country and their nefarious activities within our border. So why do these criminal networks continue to thrive with minimal resistance and maintain enough anonymity to persist?

I refused to write this article before now out of respect for the chain of command and the law enforcement institutions responsible for protecting the lives of Vincentians and visitors alike.

These principles are enshrined in their mission. However, I can no longer remain on the sidelines and watch, as families grieve, Vincentians live in fear, and the blueprint for solving SVG’s crime issue lies blatantly in front of those who have the authority to act. I will not discuss or mention corruption in this piece. Although the challenges surrounding the firearms licensing process warrant discussion, they will be addressed in a future piece to maintain focus here. In this article, I hope to outline some of the critical national security threats facing SVG and propose strictly actionable strategies to address these challenges at their roots. This is not merely a call to address “high crime rates” as statistics. It is an urgent appeal to confront a stagnation that risks amplifying the global criminal dynamics threatening to destabilize our small island nation.

Authorities within Saint Vincent and the Grenadines’ security apparatus identify illicit narcotics and illegal firearms as the two primary drivers of criminal activity in the nation. These two elements—drugs and weapons—serve as the foundation of most criminal enterprises, operating in tandem with financial schemes that sustain and expand illicit activities.

Narcotics often form the cornerstone of these operations, providing the revenue needed to fuel other illegal trade, and providing a network of smuggling that can span human trafficking and even terrorism. Firearms play a dual role: they secure and protect the narcotics business while also enabling its expansion. This often comes through forceful takeovers of territory and business or as a separate yet in its own right, highly profitable income stream. The financial aspect, often involving sophisticated money laundering schemes, ensures the operation’s longevity. By cleaning illicit earnings and enabling seamless currency exchanges, these processes effectively erase paper trails, allowing criminal networks to operate with relative impunity across international borders. Together, these interconnected elements present a complex and critical challenge for national security in SVG.

Local criminal networks alone lack the capacity to produce, package, and distribute narcotics or firearms on the scale currently observed. Through third-party brokers in the region, primarily located in South America, the merchandise is purchased from cartels, arms dealers, rebels, or even terrorists and sold through a pipeline that leads to our island. Despite what certain high-profile individuals might suggest about their origins, non-state actors and organizations often pass these items down the chain to be sold for financial profit. This reality highlights critical vulnerabilities in the nation’s security infrastructure. First among them is SVG’s effectively open borders. Having travelled through AIA a few times, I can note it maintains commendable security—likely impenetrable without insider collusion—the same cannot be said for the island’s maritime boundaries. Gaps in the operational coverage of the Saint Vincent Coast Guard create opportunities for foreign vessels to infiltrate SVG’s waters. These vessels either deliver contraband directly onto the island or drop it at sea, leaving local accomplices to retrieve and smuggle it ashore.

Addressing the impact of harmful contraband on our nation requires an honest examination of how these items enter our borders in the first place. At its core, our national security system suffers from a lack of critical resources, compounded by a personnel body that is often under-trained and lacking specialization. This is not an indictment of the individuals themselves, but rather a critique of a system that has failed to prioritize its people—both citizens and those tasked with protecting them—not just rhetorically but through meaningful action.

A set of principles in U.S. special operations, known as ‘SOF Truths’ offers valuable lessons for our Caribbean context. Three of these truths stand out: “Humans are more important than hardware,” “Quality is better than quantity,” and “Competent forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.” These truths underscore a vital reality: while equipment and infrastructure are important, it is highly trained, competent personnel who maximize their effectiveness.

Waiting for a crisis to take action is not an option. Proactive investment in training and resources is essential to building a security apparatus capable of addressing threats before they escalate into larger emergencies.

This week, I had the opportunity to speak with a close friend serving in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. During our conversation, we touched on his work, comparing the dynamics in Trinidad to those in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG). While both nations grapple with bureaucratic inefficiencies that hinder progress, SVG is fortunate not to face the same overwhelming scale of issues experienced in Trinidad and Tobago. That said, the parallels are clear: both countries contend with limited resources and insufficient training for law enforcement personnel. However, SVG’s smaller size positions it uniquely to address these concerns more effectively provided the political will and strategic focus are aligned. With proactive measures, SVG has the opportunity to implement reforms that could serve as a model for addressing systemic challenges in law enforcement across the region.

Mitigation & Response Strategies

Strategy Explained – “Close the Circle”

This strategy necessitates a dual approach, combining proactive and defensive measures to address both external and internal threats. The first priority must be securing SVG’s borders to prevent unauthorized vessels from entering and eliminating the possibility of further contraband

drops. Achieving this requires robust maritime surveillance and interception capabilities, ensuring a high level of confidence in border security.

Once the borders are effectively secured, the Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force (RSVGPF) can shift focus to internal security operations. This phase involves a targeted crackdown on known persons of interest within the country, dismantling criminal networks and disrupting their activities.

Refocus Investigation & Intelligence Units

Recent reports from multiple news outlets indicate that the Minister of National Security intends to establish a new ‘Gun Intelligence Unit’ within the Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force (RSVGPF). While the initiative may seem promising on the surface, it risks further straining the already limited resources of the department. Moreover, it raises concerns about creating a centralized entity that could evolve into a bureaucratic behemoth akin to Trinidad’s Strategic Services Agency.

Instead of redirecting resources to plan and implement a new unit, the ministry could achieve better results by optimizing existing structures. Units such as the Criminal Investigations

Department (CID) and Special Branch, already focused on investigative and intelligence work, could be retasked to prioritize gun-related crimes and associated entities. Additionally, forming a temporary task force that includes personnel from Customs, Prisons, and Immigration would leverage the expertise of various agencies. This multidisciplinary team could serve as a centralized body to gather intelligence, execute high-level operations, and coordinate strategies for deterrence and response. Recently, it was reported that His Majesty’s Prisons collected 833 phones over the past year. How many of those devices were properly searched, information shared with relevant agencies, and led to successful operations?

In the context of law enforcement and military operations, gun intelligence is not fundamentally different from other intelligence disciplines. The essential tasks—identifying persons of interest, mapping organizational connections, conducting surveillance, and executing operations based on actionable evidence—remain the same. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to form a separate unit. Instead, the focus should be on elevating the skill sets of existing personnel to meet regional and international standards.

With foreign influence in the narcotics trade escalating globally, the stakes are higher than ever.

Investing in training for fundamental disciplines such as intelligence analysis, mission planning, and operational coordination will enhance the department’s overall effectiveness.

Regional Integration

Given that much of the contraband entering Saint Vincent and the Grenadines originates from regional neighbours, unfortunately including Trinidad and Venezuela, it is imperative to adopt a regional strategy to disrupt these flows. Collaborative efforts, such as cross-training and joint deployment operations with partner forces, would not only combat the issue at its source, but also provide our officers with valuable experience and advanced training at an international standard.

Regional partnerships, such as those facilitated by CARICOM IMPACS and the Regional Security System (RSS), are essential. However, their potential remains underutilized when limited primarily to humanitarian assistance or small-scale operations. The escalating drug epidemic—marked by the trafficking of cocaine and the infiltration of fentanyl, often mixed with other substances like marijuana—demands a more aggressive and coordinated approach.

Strengthening these partnerships and maximizing their capacity for intelligence-sharing and enforcement will be critical in safeguarding our nations from the devastating impacts of transnational drug trade.

We’re not too late to stop what is a very well-managed (hear it) crime situation in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It only takes one wrong move, one broken promise, one wrong intention to change that. In a place as beautiful and rich as SVG, we deserve to live in peace and security.

The strategy is there, what are we waiting for?

Daniel Burgin

daniel.y.burgin@gmail.com