Privy Council decision

Last week we started our examination of the Privy Council’s decision in Appeal case No. 10 of 2006 between Bernard Coard and others and the Attorney General of Grenada. So far we looked at the events in Grenada which led to the appeal and I promised last week to bring you the reasoning of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the judgment that was delivered by Lord Hoffman.{{more}}

In a constitutional motion of September 23, 2002 the appellants submitted that the sentences imposed on them were unlawful and that the “warrants of commutation under which they were held in custody had no legal basis and were likewise unlawful.” Besides this there were several other grounds which their Lordships dealt with first before considering the main issue.

The absence of the appellants

One of the grounds for which Counsel for the appellant argued is that the trial was conducted for most part during the absence of the appellants. The argument put forward was that section 8(2) of the constitution precluded the imposition of a sentence of death or imprisonment in such circumstances. At the trial the appellants had withdrawn instructions from their counsel and were disruptive for most of the trial resulting in their removal from the court room from time to time. Their Lordships thought that the section laid down a rule that there was to be no trial in the absence of the defendants but that this was governed by two exception which are ‘consent’ and ‘disruption’. If the argument by the appellants holds then “anyone who is charged with a serious offence could avoid imprisonment by disrupting the proceedings.” This ground could not hold.

Warrant for life imprisonment

The appellants also proffered that the warrant of commutation to life imprisonment was invalid as it did not state precisely what the minister recommended. Counsel for the appellant claimed that the Minister had advised commutation to a sentence of imprisonment but that the warrant granted a conditional pardon which was something different. Their Lordships did not agree that this invalidated the sentence. They felt that the Governor- General did what was constitutionally required of him to give effect to the Minister’s advice and the fact that the document was imperfectly drafted did not change the sentence.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal

Another claim made by counsel for the appellant is that their constitutional rights under section 8(3) had been infringed because the appellants had not received a copy of the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The judgment was an oral judgment and there was no specific application to the Court for the same and according to their Lordships there appeared to have been no transcript. The judges had read from a text which could only become part of the record if the judges authorized it. It was not so done and it therefore did not breach the section.

Right to appeal

Counsel for the appellants contended that the constitutional right of the appellant to appeal was denied and asked leave to provide affidavits on matters relating to the case. In answer to this, their Lordships thought that the right to appeal to the Privy Council had been abolished by People’s Act No. 84 of 1991 during the revolutionary period. Restoration to the pre- revolutionary period in 1991 could not operate retrospectively to enable a review.(The main issue next week)

Ada Johnson is a solicitor and barrister-at-law.
E-mail address is: exploringthelaw@yahoo.com