The banana cycle – Part 3
At the same time the British market, the lifeline for the Windwards, was rapidly changing in character. More and more the giant supermarket chains gained dominance in the market and the intense rivalry between them introduced a new unwelcome element, with banana prices being lowered in the race for market share and the competition from cheaper Latin American bananas squeezing our producers out of the market.
As conditions worsened, so did the degree of unrest in the banana industry, and the demands for more farmer control intensified. The curious twinning of banana politics with party politics in all the Windward Islands did not help either. The situation exploded in St Lucia in the 1996/7 period and forced the privatisation of the Banana Association there, after protests which cost the lives of three young men. The St Lucia Banana Corporation, SLBC, was set up and Government ceded its legal control and repealed laws ensuring state monopoly.
This had the effect of spurring similar demands in Dominica and here in St Vincent and the Grenadines. With the change of political administration in 2001, significant reforms in the administration and management of the industry were instituted. But while St Lucia had gone the way of complete privatisation, which opened the door to fragmentation and rivalry between farmer-owned companies, the SVG experiment was able to benefit from the lessons of its northern neighbour. A hybrid arrangement was instituted, with farmers taking over the administration, while Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, maintained responsibility for pest and disease control.
By that time as well, a new element had been introduced into the sub-regional industry. The Windward Islands Farmers Association (WINFA) had been formed as long ago as 1982, with a broad farmer focus in which banana was only a part. But as the “green-goldââ attraction became pre-eminent in the eighties and early nineties, it was only natural that, more and more, its attention became more preoccupied with banana matters.
That turned out to be a godsend for the industry, for the traditional leadership simply had no answer to the deepening crisis of the nineties, having failed to take account of the rapidly changing circumstances in the market. It was left to WINFA to provide leadership, vision and a search for alternative marketing arrangements. These led to the quest for Fairtrade certification, achieved in 2000, and without which the extra-regional market would have disappeared altogether.
But this did not come easily, for there was resistance at every turn by the entrenched interests in the industry, and a lack of understanding of the principles of the Fairtrade movement by farmers and governments alike. The success of the new disposition depended on a fundamental transformation of the industry in order to keep pace with the new realities, the degree to which farmers became more market-oriented in their approach to production and marketing, and the absolute need for farmer control to mean efficient management. Power brings with it responsibility and those who yearn for it have to learn how to exercise it judiciously and undertake the responsibilities which go with it.
That is one factor of the equation which was not sufficiently addressed and as the crisis deepened, through no fault of the farmers and their organisations, our weaknesses in this regard became an obstacle in the way of keeping the industry on an even keel and making optimum use of opportunities.
Forgive me for extending this analysis, but limitations on column space mean that I must add a Part 4 next week to bring conclusion to this series.
Renwick Rose is a community activist and social com- mentator.
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