Lewis’ life sentence reduced to 25 years in prison

Years after Rudolph Lewis’ guilty plea to murder was rejected by the high court and he was sentenced to life imprisonment, Appeal Court Justice Ola Mae Edwards is of the view that the applicable provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code and the common law of England do not prohibit a High Court judge from accepting a plea of guilty on a murder charge.{{more}}

On April 16, 2012, in a judgement handed down in the British Virgin Islands, Edwards ruled that Lewis’ appeal against sentence was allowed and the sentence of life imprisonment be set aside and a sentence of 25 years imprisonment be substituted.

The appeal was heard on June 7, 2011, before Justices of Appeal Edwards, Davidson Baptiste and Don Mitchell at the High Court in Kingstown.

Attorney Ronald Marks represented the appellant and Director of Public Prosecutions Colin Williams along with Sejilla McDowall and Colin John appeared for the respondents.

On March 22, 2008, the appellant was indicted for the murder of his 21-year-old common law wife, Marcia Agatha Quammie of Questelles. Lewis was later convicted on May 18, 2009 and sentenced to life imprisonment on July 10, 2009, by Justice Frederick Bruce Lyle.

Lewis stabbed Quammie to death at their home in Questelles, because he felt that she was cheating on him. Lewis had concocted a story in order to get Quammie to leave her sister’s home in Evesham and come back to Questelles. He said he went to Evesham and told Quammie that something had happened to one of their two children and that the doctor needed her to come to the hospital. Instead of going to the hospital, Lewis took Quammie home, stating that the child needed clothes.

The appellant, who was legally represented at his arraignment by attorney Grant Connell, pleaded guilty to the charge when it was put to him. However, the learned trial judge refused to accept his plea, and entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf. Neither the appellant’s counsel nor the Director of Public Prosecutions objected to this.

On appeal against sentence, the appellant contended that the punishment was excessive and ought to be reduced to a term of years, having regard to the fact that he had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity and his plea had been refused.

In his written submission, Marks successfully argued that at the time the appellant proffered his guilty plea, the law which ought to have guided the judge in the absence of an equivocal plea of guilty was sections 184 and 186 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

According to the judgement, Edwards is of the view that “the trial judge has the discretion to accept such a guilty plea even where the DPP serves a death penalty notice of his intention to seek the death penalty on conviction of the defendant.

“Had the trial judge accepted the appellant’s guilty plea without adhering to established procedure, as Bernard C.J opined in Habib, the trial of the appellant would have been a nullity. Regrettably, neither Mr Grant Connell nor the DPP rendered any assistance to the court of law and applicable procedure,” the judge ruled.

“In light of the psychiatric report and evidence from Dr Morris-Patterson who had examined the appellant before he was arraigned, we know that at the date he was arraigned he would have been fit to plead,” the judgement read.

However, it was the DPP’s contention that the trial judge treated the appellant as a defendant who had pleaded guilty.

The document quoted the DPP as saying, “Sentencing in murder cases is at the discretion of the judge, who may impose such a sentence as the circumstances of the crime and the aggravating and mitigating factors demand. Judges usually try to be consistent and are entitled to consider similar cases. This court would not substitute its opinion for the discretion of the sentencing as long as the sentence is not outside the generous ambit within which discretion could have been exercised.”

According to Justice Edwards, there was no evidence from the psychiatrist and social inquiry report that the appellant, on the basis of the murder and his previous history was a social nuisance, highly likely to commit grave offences of violence in the future.

“There was therefore no evidence to justify the learned judge’s approach, treating the appellant as if he was a danger to society and there was the need to protect the society from him. This was an error the judge made in my opinion,” Edwards ruled.

Edwards ruled that the trial judge did not take the significant mitigating factors into account at all and that the appellant had strong mitigating factors in his favour. “In my view, the sentence of life imprisonment did not sufficiently take into account the personal circumstances leading up to the offence. It is mandatory requirement in murder cases for a judge to take into account the personal and individual circumstances of the convicted person…

“The personal circumstances of the appellant which the learned trial judge omitted to consider would justify the court abandoning or placing less emphasis on the objective of deterrence in my view. Because the learned judge erred in the exercise of his discretion, it is our duty to consider afresh and exercise our own deliberate judgement on the sentence that this murder required…. I would allow the appeal against sentence, set aside the sentence of life imprisonment and substitute a sentence of 25 years imprisonment to run from 22 March 2008, the date of his arrest,” the judge concluded.

Commenting on the matter, Marks said it was very fulfilling to see the hard work that their Chambers put into the matter manifested itself into a successful Appeal.

“It is a particularly helpful judgement in that it clarifies the issue of a defendant’s right to plea guilty to murder, and reinforces the position that if someone kills in a fit of passion, that this should be regarded as a mitigating factor at sentencing…,” Marks said.

He also noted that it is always good to be a part of these landmark judgements, especially when “You are on the winning end.”